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Introduction
This work examines the effect of a sizable highly skilled immigration on educational incentives for the native population. The analysis is performed in the context of a growth model with uncertainty regarding the return to previously acquired human capital building on Mountford (1997) who identified the importance of uncertainty with regard to the possibility of migration to a higher wage country as a driving force behind the beneficial effect of a brain drain emigration for human capital formation in the source countries. Later on, this idea became popular in development economics (see references e.g. in Fan and Stark, 2007; Beine et al., 2008) . All these publications assume that immigration flows are sufficiently small and do not affect labor market opportunities in the destination countries. Here, in contrast, I suppose that immigration inflows are not too small, and point to the uncertainty with regard to the labor market opportunities for the native population in the receiving countries as a result of the arrival of a sizable mass of foreign competitors.
The main idea is roughly as follows. In a world with some uncertainty with regard to the occupational match along with the irreversibility of investments in education, the arrival of a sizable mass of potential competitors is likely to increase the perceived probability of a possible occupational mismatch for skilled native individuals. This reduces their ex-ante returns to human capital investments and discourages them at the margin. As a consequence, if the immigration-induced adverse effect on educational incentives for the natives outweighs the positive contribution of the imported brains to the host economy's human capital stock, the highly skilled immigration may adversely affect economic growth in the host economy.
The present model relies upon empirical observations from labor economics.
As has been widely recognized in the labor economics, an arrival of a sizable mass of foreign competitors reduces economic opportunities for native labor force (e.g., Borjas, 2003; 2007; . In particular, it has been found that an exogenous increase in the supply of skilled labor, as a result of a sizable skilled immigration, adversely affects educational incentives for natives (e.g., Borjas, 2007; .
Evidence also suggests that in the US in several high-skilled fields such as, for instance, computer science and research biology labs, foreign labor, to a large extent, drove native labor out.
Moreover, in a large and growing recent literature on the formation of attitudes of natives toward immigrants, 1 it has been argued that the natives' concerns about the detrimental effect of immigration on their labor market opportunities are not necessarily driven by the true negative effect of immigration, but rather by the perceived negative effect, which is likely to overstate the real effect thus reducing the natives' ex-ante returns to human capital investments more than proportionally.
The Model
The model presents a small open overlapping generations economy that exists in a world with one good and perfect capital mobility. The world's one good is produced under constant returns to scale by two factors, capital and efficiency units of labor.
There is a continuum of agents in each generation. For simplicity the measure of agents in the starting period is normalized to unity.
Production of goods and factor prices
The total amount of capital and efficiency units of labor in time period t , are denoted by t K and t L , respectively. The productivity of labor in period t is given by t  .
At time t the output t Y is produced using a constant returns to scale production function:
This production function is required to satisfy the standard assumptions:
along with the Inada conditions:
Factor prices are determined in the standard way by the factor's marginal product. Suppose, for simplicity, that the world rate of return to capital * r is constant. Under assumption of perfect capital mobility and the smallness of the economy, the domestic rate of return to capital t r is thus fixed to * r , which fixes the domestic capital to the efficiency labor ratio t k as well. 
We assume that all generations have latent abilities, which are picked from the same distribution and that the abilities of children are independent from the abilities of their parents.
Individuals' educational decision
Agents live for two periods in an overlapping-generations world and derive utility from their consumption in the second period. In their first period of life agents can invest in education. The cost of education is assumed to be fixed at c units of output.
There are no restrictions on borrowing at a fixed interest rate * r . Agents, who invest in education, obtain Therefore, for agent i it is optimal to invest in human capital if 
Dynamics of the economy
To characterize the dynamic behavior of the economy, we assume that there is an economy-wide growth externality related to the proportion of educated workers in the economy in the previous period. An assumption that the level of productivity in an economy is related to some measure of past educational level has been widely used in the models of economic growth. If the number of highly skilled immigrants is large enough, the arrival of a sizable mass of potential competitors is likely to increase the perceived probability of occupational mismatch for skilled native individuals. To model this effect, suppose that in presence of a sizable highly skilled immigration the perceived probability of a successful occupational match for an educated native individual is
, and, correspondingly, the probability of an occupational mismatch is
Clearly, it is natural to assume that IMM  decreases with the size of immigration.
Denoting by t IMM the fraction of immigrant population relative to the original native population in period t , this implies that 0
Therefore, in presence of immigration, only agents with a latent ability higher than IMM ê will invest in education, where IMM t ê is defined by:
Obviously, since
, the higher is the size of the skilled immigration, the lower is the fraction of the native population that becomes skilled.
To establish whether skilled immigration is growth enhancing or depleting, compare the fraction of educated workers, natives and immigrants, in the host economy in presence of immigration ( 
Otherwise, highly skilled immigration is growth depleting and the host economy loses from the arrival of imported brains.
Conclusion
This work distinguishes two opposite growth effects of a highly skilled immigration. I point to the uncertainty regarding the labor market opportunities for the native population in the destination country due to the arrival of a sizable mass of foreign competitors. I further show that a highly skilled immigration can be either growth enhancing if the positive contribution of imported brains to the host economy's human capital stock outweighs the immigration-induced adverse effect on educational incentives for natives, or growth depleting if the latter effect dominates. 
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